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11.1    Introduction
Do labor market intermediaries in general, and temp agencies in particu-
lar, help unskilled workers with limited work experience transition to more 
stable and higher-  wage jobs? Earlier research on the impact of temporary 
help agencies for this population was generally positive. However, recent 
research by Autor and Houseman (2005, 2007), using data from a random 
assignment experiment, has raised questions about the robustness of the 
early research, and especially on whether any positive eﬀects of temp agency 
employment persist over the longer run. Other researchers have continued 
to ﬁ  nd positive eﬀects for low earners of temp employment, among other 
eﬀorts by a range of labor market intermediaries such as unions and various 
not- for- proﬁ  t placement agencies.
In this chapter we contribute to the ongoing discussion about temp agen-
cies and low-  wage workers in a number of ways. We do this by using a very 
large-  scale matched database on ﬁ  rms and employees that enables us to 
establish a broad set of facts about the workers who use temp agencies and 
the ﬁ  rms to which they transition. The data set has several key features that 
we use throughout the study. The ﬁ  rst of these is that it is longitudinal in 
both ﬁ  rms and workers. A second key feature is that we estimated ﬁ  xed per-
sonal characteristics that are unobserved in many studies. We also directly 
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estimate the premium (or discount) that diﬀerent ﬁ  rms pay observationally 
equivalent workers.
Our analysis begins by estimating the impact of temp employment for 
initially low earners on their subsequent earnings. We then examine whether 
workers who work for temp agencies eventually transition to ﬁ  rms that pay 
higher wage premiums than do workers who ﬁ  nd ﬁ  rms on their own. This 
is followed by a consideration of the extent to which these ﬁ  rm character-
istics can account for any observed improvements in the earnings of these 
workers. Finally, we examine the long- term stability of the employment and 
earnings outcomes for low-  wage workers engaged in temp work, relative to 
those who are not.
Our results show that temp earners clearly have lower earnings than oth-
ers while working at these agencies, and even their subsequent earnings are 
somewhat mixed. But these earnings are generally higher if they manage 
to gain stable employment with other employers. In particular, we ﬁ  nd that 
the eﬀects of temp agency employment in the base period on subsequent 
earnings are uniformly positive for those reporting full-  quarter earnings 
and for all earnings once we control for job tenure. Furthermore, the posi-
tive eﬀects seem mostly to occur because those working for temp agencies 
subsequently work for higher-  wage ﬁ  rms than do comparable low earners 
who do not work for temps.
11.2    Previous  Literature
The fact that the temporary help industry generates substantial employ-
ment for workers in the low-  wage labor market has been well documented 
(Autor and Houseman 2002). But its impact on the employment outcomes 
of these workers, however, is not clear a priori. On the one hand, temp agen-
cies might provide a productive stepping stone on the path to more stable 
employment, both by reducing search time and imparting useful job skills. 
On the other hand, they might be seen as part of a “secondary” labor market 
in which low-  wage workers churn from bad job to bad job.
Why might temp agencies have positive eﬀects? A body of earlier work 
strongly suggests that the characteristics of ﬁ  rms and jobs, independently 
of worker skills, aﬀect the labor market outcomes of less-  skilled workers 
(Abowd et al. 2004; Holzer and Martinson 2004).1 And various groups of 
less-  skilled workers, especially minorities, might have less access on their 
own to stable employment and higher-  wage jobs. For example, these work-
ers might lack the informal networks and contacts that are often necessary 
to gain such employment (Holzer 1987; Ioannides and Loury 2004), or they 
1. This notion, of course, has been heavily debated for decades in the labor economics lit-
erature—especially in discussions over “dual labor markets” and “eﬃciency wages.” See Katz 
(1986) and Rebitzer (1993) for thoughtful reviews on these issues. For an earlier treatment of 
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might lack the transportation and information needed to overcome spa-
tial mismatch between their residential locations (particularly in inner-  city 
neighborhoods or rural areas) and the more suburbanized locations of bet-
ter jobs (Holzer 1991; Kain 1992; Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1998). On the latter 
issue, Andersson, Holzer, and Lane (2005) also show that employers paying 
higher wage premiums tend to locate farther away from the residential areas 
inhabited by low- wage workers than do other employers, further suggesting 
some geographic mismatch between less-  skilled workers and higher-  wage 
job opportunities.
But do temp agencies help less- skilled workers overcome these geographic 
and informational gaps, thus improving their employment opportunities? 
Does the general skills training that they often provide these workers (Autor 
2001) perhaps contribute to their opportunities as well?
Initial empirical research based on both survey and administrative data 
provided some evidence that temp agencies were providing pathways to more 
stable employment. Lane, Mikelson, and Summers (2003) applied matched 
propensity score techniques to data from the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation and concluded that spells in temp agency employment 
improved labor market outcomes relative to spells of unemployment. Hei-
nrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005) came to similar conclusions.
In a more broad-  ranging study using the same data set used in this chap-
ter, Andersson, Holzer, and Lane (2005) found that low earners employed 
by temporary help services who subsequently changed ﬁ  rms were more 
likely to exit their low-  earning status than were low earners not working 
for temps, while those who stayed with the temporary help ﬁ  rms had much 
lower chances of improving their earnings status. This was true even after 
controlling for person- ﬁ  xed eﬀects, and a variety of observable worker char-
acteristics. Furthermore, the research suggested that the positive impacts of 
earlier temp employment were largely accounted for by the characteristics 
of the ﬁ  rms in which they were subsequently employed. This suggested that 
temp agencies seemed to oﬀer low earners better access to other higher- wage 
ﬁ  rms rather than higher-  wage employment while at the agency.
More recent work continues to show positive eﬀects. For instance, Benner, 
Leete, and Pastor (2007) examined survey data on employers and workers 
in Milwaukee and Silicon Valley who used temp agencies, and a variety of 
not- for- proﬁ  t intermediaries, to help ﬁ  ll job vacancies. Like Andersson, 
Holzer, and Lane, they ﬁ  nd that workers who used temp agencies to ﬁ  nd 
employment had higher earnings in subsequent jobs—though this seemed 
due more to higher hours worked than higher wages. Some other types of 
intermediaries—including community colleges, labor unions, and other 
not- for- proﬁ  t agencies—seemed to generate higher wages as well as hours 
worked in subsequent jobs. A large number of European studies have similar 
positive ﬁ  ndings (see Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini [2006] for a review).
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the appropriate comparison groups, and concerns remain about selection 
on variables (including time-  varying characteristics in studies that control 
for person- ﬁ  xed eﬀects) that are unobservable to the econometrician. In the 
only study to date that has used random assignment of Temporary Assis-
tance to Needy Families (TANF) recipients to temporary help agencies, 
Autor and Houseman (2005, 2007) found that temp agencies increased the 
short-  term earnings for workers—but their longer-  term employment was 
characterized by lower earnings, less- frequent employment, and higher wel-
fare recidivism.
Autor and Houseman also found that other intermediaries, which gen-
erated longer-  term job placements for their clients, also generated some 
positive impacts over time. But some questions remain about the external 
validity of their results—especially since they are based only on TANF 
recipients, rather than a broader range of low-  wage workers; and they use 
data from the “Work First” agency in only one city (Detroit) to generate 
their ﬁ  ndings.2
11.3    Our  Data
11.3.1      An Overview of the LEHD Data
The data used in this study are drawn from the Longitudinal Employer 
Household Dynamics (LEHD) program at the U.S. Census Bureau. The 
core of the data set is the universe of state-  level quarterly Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) earnings records from forty-  four states and the District of 
Columbia. The UI wage records cover data from the early 1990s to the third 
quarter of 2006 and have been merged with a variety of other household and 
employer survey data, including the 2000 Decennial Census of Population, 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), and the American Community Sur-
vey (ACS). This integration, which takes place under strict conﬁ  dentiality 
protection protocols, is represented in ﬁ  gure 11.1.
The LEHD data have elsewhere been described in great detail (Anders-
son, Holzer, and Lane 2005; Abowd, Haltiwanger, and Lane 2004). Brieﬂ  y, 
the UI wage records, which consist of quarterly reports ﬁ  led by employers 
every quarter for each individual in covered employment, permit the con-
struction of a database that provides longitudinal information on workers, 
ﬁ  rms, and the match between the two. The coverage is roughly 96 percent of 
private nonfarm wage and salary employment; the coverage of agricultural 
and federal government employment is less comprehensive. Self-  employed 
individuals and independent contractors are also not covered. Although 
2. Autor and Houseman note that their nonexperimental results are very similar to those 
of other researchers, perhaps implying that their results are more generalizable than might be 
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the administrative records themselves are subject to some error, staﬀ at the 
LEHD program has invested substantial resources in cleaning the records 
and making them internally consistent.3
The Census Bureau information used in this study consists primarily of 
basic demographic information: date of birth, place of birth, sex, and a 
crude measure of race and ethnicity. These are available for almost all work-
ers in the data set—the nonmatch rate is about 4 percent. The UI wage 
records have also been matched with the Current Population Survey, but 
since this is a cross-  sectional match we simply use it as a consistency check 
in the research.
There are clearly many advantages associated with this integrated data-
base—its enormous sample size, longitudinal structure, and information on 
employer- employee matches. There are also some disadvantages. One is that 
hours or weeks worked are typically not reported by employers. Another is 
that it is impossible to identify whether, when multiple jobs are held within 
a quarter, they are held sequentially or at the same time. We address both of 
these issues by creating, for each individual in the data, a measure of that 
person’s annualized earnings at the primary employer in each year that they 
appear in the data. That is, for the entire year that an individual appears 
in a state, we identify his or her primary employer as the one that pays the 
highest earnings in that year.
There are two additional conceptual issues to be addressed. Although 
we typically refer to the employer as a “ﬁ  rm,” the actual reporting unit 
in the data is an administrative rather than an economic entity; in other 
words, the ﬁ  ling unit reﬂ  ects an “Employer Identiﬁ  cation Number” rather 
than a speciﬁ  c ﬁ  rm. The distinction is immaterial for about 70 percent of 
workers, who work for a single establishment employer—but for those who 
work for a multiple-  establishment employer, it is really not clear whether 
Fig. 11.1    LEHD data set used: Longitudinal employer-  household dynamics
3. The approach is described in Abowd and Vilhuber (2005).378        Fredrik Andersson, Harry J. Holzer, and Julia Lane
they are working for the ﬁ  rm or an establishment. The other conceptual 
issue involves the measurement of earnings. According to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (1997), UI wage records measure “gross wages and salaries, 
bonuses, stock options, tips, and other gratuities, and the value of meals 
and lodging, where supplied.” They do not include employer contributions 
to Old age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI), health insurance, 
workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and private pension and 
welfare funds.
Given the sensitive nature of the data set, it is worth discussing the conﬁ  -
dentiality protection in some detail. All data that are brought into the LEHD 
system have been made anonymous, in the sense that standard identiﬁ  ers 
and names are stripped oﬀ and replaced by a unique “Protected Identiﬁ  ca-
tion Key,” or PIK. Only Census Bureau employees or individuals who have 
Special Sworn Status are permitted to work with the data, and they have 
not only been subject to an FBI check but also are subject to a $250,000 
ﬁ  ne and/  or ﬁ  ve years in jail if the identity of an individual or business is 
disclosed. All projects have to be reviewed by the Census Bureau and other 
data custodians, and any tables or regression results that are released are 
subject to full disclosure review.
Standard measures of human capital include such variables as educa-
tion and experience. Other measures, such as ability or family background, 
have rarely been able to be captured, yet work by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 
(1993), for example, demonstrates that a major contribution to increased 
earnings inequality in the 1980s was an increase in return to “unmeasured” 
characteristics—for example, interpersonal skills. Work by Holzer (1996), 
as well as the sociology literature, also ﬁ  nds that businesses increasingly 
value characteristics of the employee that have not traditionally been observ-
able—again, interpersonal skills are frequently mentioned.
The newly developed longitudinal data set permits the quantiﬁ  cation of 
the value of these measures, although not permitting a decomposition of the 
source.4 This is achieved by capturing the portable component of individual 
earnings—that component that belongs to an individual as she or he moves 
from job to job in the labor market (and that is separate from the type of 
ﬁ  rm for which she or he works). In order to estimate this eﬀect, the LEHD 
staﬀ decomposed the log real annualized full- time, full- year wage rate (ln w) 
into person and ﬁ  rm eﬀects:5
4. We interpret this person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect as a broad measure of human capital, though the 
source of the human capital—whether interpersonal skills, cognitive ability, family back-
ground, or some combination of these and other factors—cannot be determined.
5. This methodology is drawn from Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and further 
developed by Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002). A key assumption underlying this meth-
odology is that worker mobility is (largely) exogenous. See Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 
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(1) ln  wit  i  xit  J(i,t)  εit
 h ˆ
ijt   ˆ
i  xit
exp  ˆexp
 z ˆj   ˆ
j.
The deﬁ  nition of human capital we use here, h, is the part associated with 
the person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect—the unobservable individual heterogeneity—and 
the measurable personal characteristics (labor force experience, education). 
We are also interested in capturing and analyzing the role of the ﬁ  rm eﬀect 
. The ﬁ  rm eﬀect literally captures the extent to which the ﬁ  rm the worker is 
attached to pays above or below average wages (after controlling for person 
eﬀects).6
The ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect similarly captures a variety of factors. Most simplis-
tically, it captures the premium or discount that a given ﬁ  rm pays workers on 
average, controlling for their individual characteristics. This premium might 
be due to a higher level of capital in the ﬁ  rm, which would clearly increase 
the productivity of individual workers. Or, it might be due to unionization—
the transportation equipment industry, for example, has a relatively high 
average ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect. It might also be a compensating diﬀerential—the 
high average ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect in the mining industry is presumably in order 
to compensate workers for the riskiness and unpleasantness of mine work. 
Finally, the ﬁ  rm eﬀect will capture a range of human resource policies cho-
sen by the ﬁ  rm, including the eﬀects of training and promotion policies as 
well as compensation.
11.3.2      Sample Used Here and Deﬁ  nitions
Consistent with our earlier work (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005), we 
use a sample of LEHD data for ﬁ  ve states in this study: California, Florida, 
Illinois, Maryland, and North Carolina. These were the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve states for 
which long panels of microdata on both ﬁ  rms and workers were available to 
LEHD researchers. As we note in the following, we use data over the period 
1993 to 2001 for workers who were prime- age adults in 1993 and who had at 
least minimal labor force attachment and earnings in each year. The result 
was a sample that included roughly eighteen million workers working in over 
1 million ﬁ  rms per year.
The demographic characteristics of the workforce in the LEHD data, 
both overall and within these ﬁ  ve states, are very similar to those of the 
decennial Census. There are, however, a few diﬀerences. The LEHD data 
6. The individual ﬁ  xed eﬀects in our sample are estimates based on data through the year 
1998. In our empirical work that follows, we report some earnings equations based on our own 
sample of data from 1996 to 1998 and also from 1999 to 2001. Clearly, our empirical work using 
the latter sample is not subject to any concerns about the use of ﬁ  xed-  eﬀects wage measures 
that have been estimated over part of the time same period. Results over the two time periods 
are generally quite consistent with one another, as we note in the following.380        Fredrik Andersson, Harry J. Holzer, and Julia Lane
used here have a high proportion of younger workers overall (about 20 per-
cent), than do either the ﬁ  ve-  state Census sample or the full Census, which 
may be due to coverage and reporting diﬀerences. The ﬁ  ve states that we are 
studying have a lower proportion of white workers than does the country 
at large—about 66 percent here rather than 78 percent for the nation. The 
industry distribution is, by and large, very similar—although the LEHD 
data show more workers in professional services, and fewer in educational, 
health, and social services. The earnings in the ﬁ  ve states are typically slightly 
higher than for the country at large, but the LEHD earnings measures are, on 
average, slightly lower—probably primarily due to the coverage diﬀerences 
that were mentioned earlier.
As pointed out in our book, there are a variety of considerations associ-
ated with deﬁ  ning low earners on the basis of administrative data on quar-
terly and annual earnings only. It is important to try to separate out individu-
als who voluntarily work part time at high wage from those who work full 
time but at low wages, since UI wage records do not provide information on 
hours or weeks worked. Similarly, from a policy perspective, it is useful to 
separate those with transitory earnings diﬃculties—such as those return-
ing to the labor market after a lengthy absence or those who have recently 
been displaced from a job—from those with persistent earnings diﬃculties 
over some number of years. Similarly, when studying the impacts of temp 
agencies, it is also important to measure impacts over a substantial period 
of time, so that transitory impacts can be separated from persistent ones in 
the labor market.
The practical way in which we address the ﬁ  rst of these challenges is to limit 
the sample to one of prime- age workers (i.e., those aged twenty- ﬁ  ve through 
ﬁ  fty-  four), at the beginning of our period of analysis (1993). This at least 
partially eliminates the largest groups who are most likely to work part time—
such as students and the elderly (and near- elderly). While some groups of vol-
untary part- time workers—such as homemakers—will remain in the sample, 
the analysis will provide breakouts by gender (and also by race/  ethnicity), 
thereby separating groups with many voluntary part-  time workers (such as 
white females) from others where there presumably are fewer.
The second practical challenge is to identify people who are both attached 
to the labor market and persistently low earners. We address the attachment 
issue by only including in our sample of low earners those who have worked 
for at least one quarter in each year and earn at least $2,000 per year when 
doing so. These conditions are also applied for the subsequent six years of 
the sample, which tends to omit those who left the population of earners in 
a state for any number of reasons.7
7. Since each individual is required to appear in our data in each year of the analysis, we omit 
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We deﬁ  ne persistently low earners as those who earn $12,000 per year or 
less for each of three years during a three- year base period of 1993 to 1995.8 
The three- year base period is long enough that we generally avoid those with 
strictly transitory problems, and focus instead on those with persistent low 
earnings. The implications for our sample sizes, and the characteristics of 
our sample (both in terms of employment outcomes, person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects, 
and temp agency employment) of these various sample restrictions are con-
sidered in the appendix. As expected, limiting the sample to persistently 
low earners in the base period clearer reduces outcomes and personal skills 
(while raising the incidence of temp agency employment, as we note later), 
but further limiting the sample in subsequent years beyond the base period 
has little eﬀect on any of these measures.
In any event, after analyzing temp agency employment during the base 
period, we then examine labor market outcomes for low earners, and espe-
cially the impact of temp employment during the base period, in the six years 
subsequent to the base period. We also divide the six-  year period into two 
three- year periods, 1996 to 1998 and 1999 to 2001. This enables us to exam-
ine the stability of these subsequent labor market outcomes for a lengthy 
period of time, and separate out transitory from more persistent impacts.
The $12,000 cutoﬀ for low earnings may seem somewhat arbitrary, 
but we have an extended discussion in our earlier work (Andersson, 
Holzer, and Lane 2005) in which we discuss the basis for, and impli-
cations of, this cutoﬀ.9 The bottom line is that we ﬁ  nd that the $12,000 
cutoﬀ generates a sample of workers whose personal and family charac-
teristics approximate those in which we are most interested.10 However, 
we also consider those in an intermediate category of earnings in the base 
period (whom we call “occasionally low earners”), who earn less than 
$12,000 a year for at least one but not all of the three years in the base 
period.
8. Earnings are measured in 1998 dollars. We have used the CPI-  U to deﬂ  ate earnings over 
time. Though this index is known to overstate the rate of inﬂ  ation over time (e.g., Schultz 
2003), this will have no eﬀect on comparisons across groups in earnings or earnings growth in 
comparable time periods. We also have no data on the pecuniary values of fringe beneﬁ  ts for 
employees; however, these data are routinely omitted from calculations of poverty rates and 
the like. Inclusion of these measures would, if anything, exacerbate measured inequality across 
groups (Hamermesh 1999).
9. During this time period, a family relying on the earnings of a single worker earning $12,000 
or less would clearly have income below the poverty line for a family of three, and even below 
the poverty line for a family of four if potential eligibility for the Earned Income Tax Credit 
were taken into account. Varying this cutoﬀ in our earlier work never aﬀected our qualitative 
results.
10. See the appendix to chapter 4 of our book, where we consider the educational char-
acteristics and family incomes of workers from a smaller sample of LEHD workers who are 
matched to Current Population Survey (CPS) data and who are persistently low earners by our 
deﬁ  nition. The vast majority of these workers had education levels of high school or less and 
had family incomes below twice the poverty line.382        Fredrik Andersson, Harry J. Holzer, and Julia Lane
11.4    Results
11.4.1    Summary  Statistics
We begin with some data on the use of temp agencies by workers during 
our three- year base period (1993 to 1995). In table 11.1 we present summary 
data on the incidence of temp employment for all workers as well as sepa-
rately by their earnings status in the base period—namely, for persistently 
low earners, occasionally low earners, and non-  low earners.11 We also pres-
ent these results for individuals who had any employment through a temp 
agency over a three-  year period, as well as for those who had temporary 
agencies as their primary source of employment over that period.
Our results show that, over a three-  year period, roughly 8 percent of the 
sample’s entire prime-  age workforce has had some employment through 
a temporary agency—though only about 1 percent of the workforce had 
temp agencies as their primary employer over that period. However, when 
the sample is limited to include only persistently low earners, it is clear that 
temp agencies play a much greater role in securing employment for these 
workers than for the workforce overall—with 16 percent of all such low 
earners having some temp experience during those three years and about 4 
percent having temp work as their primary source of employment. Temp 
employment for the “occasionally low earners” is very similar to that of 
workers whose earnings are “persistently low,” but it is considerably lower 
for the “non-  low earners,” with 4 percent of this latter group having any 
temp experience and less than 1 percent working primarily for temps.
In table 11.2 we consider the personal characteristics of those who work 
for temp agencies during our base period. Once again, we consider these 
characteristics for all workers and for persistently low earners who have 
either worked for a temp agency or not, and we separately consider any work 
through a temp agency versus temp work as a primary source of employ-
Table 11.1  Use of temp agencies by workers in the base period (1993–1995)
Temp work   Non- low  (%)   Occasionally low (%)   Persistently low (%)   All workers (%)
Any 4.0 16.0 16.3 8.0
Primary   0.6   2.4   3.8   1.3
Notes: Temp employment is considered “primary” if the agency was the worker’s employer for the largest 
number of quarters in the three-  year period. “Persistently low” earners are those who earned less than 
$12,000 per year (in 1998 dollars) for all three years between 1993 and 1995; “Occasionally low” had 
earnings less than $15,000 for at least some years, and “Non-  low” earners had earnings above $15,000 
for each of the three years.
11. “Persistently Low” earners are those who earned less than $12,000 per year (in 1998 
dollars) for all three years between 1993 and 1995; “Occasionally Low” had earnings of less 
than $15,000 for at least some years, and “Non-  Low” earners had earnings above $15,000 for 
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ment. For all of these groups, we present data on the gender (female), age 
groups (twenty-  ﬁ  ve to thirty-  four, thirty-  ﬁ  ve to forty-  four, or forty-  ﬁ  ve to 
ﬁ  fty-  four), and race of such workers, as well as whether they are foreign- 
born. We also tabulate the mean person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects of workers in each 
category.12
A number of ﬁ  ndings appear in table 11.2. Among workers of all earnings 
categories, those working at temp agencies are generally younger, more likely 
Table 11.2  Personal characteristics of workers by temp agency employment in the 
base period
Any (%) Primary (%)
  Temp employment   Yes   No   Yes   No  
A. All workers
Female 49.4 46.5 46.7 47.7
Age 
25–34 50.5 36.6 43.6 37.7
35–44 32.6 36.9 34.9 36.6
45–54 16.9 26.4 21.5 25.7
Race 
White 60.8 74.0 63.3 73.1
Black 21.5 11.1 20.0 11.8
Asian 4.8 4.3 4.4 4.4
Hispanic 13.0 10.6 12.4 10.8
Foreign born 18.1 17.6 18.0 17.6
Person- ﬁ  xed eﬀect –0.06 0.08 –0.08 0.07
B. Persistently low earners in the base period
Female 50.9 65.1 48.3 63.4
Age 
25–34 54.1 40.2 46.7 42.3
35–44 31.1 35.0 34.6 34.4
45–54 14.7 24.8 18.7 23.3
Race 
White 48.8 59.9 47.7 58.5
Black 30.1 13.1 32.0 15.3
Asian 4.8 2.9 2.9 4.5
Hispanic 18.2 22.2 17.4 21.7
Foreign born 20.3 29.7 19.7 28.4
  Person- ﬁ  xed eﬀect   –0.41   –0.59   –0.47   –0.56  
Notes: “Yes” and “No” under “Any” refer to those individuals who did and did not have any 
temp agency work experience respectively during the base period. “Yes” and “no” under “Pri-
mary” refer to those who did and did not have temp work as their primary form of employ-
ment. The latter category under “primary” includes those who have some nonprimary temp 
experience as well as those with no such experience at all.
12. Mean estimated person-   (and ﬁ  rm-  ) ﬁ  xed eﬀects for the entire samples are both zero. 
Thus, positive and negative eﬀects indicate those individuals with above-  average and below-
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to be minority (especially black), and more likely to have below-  average 
personal earnings characteristics (i.e., ﬁ  xed eﬀects) than those not working 
at temp agencies.
Among those workers with persistently low earnings, those who work at 
temp agencies are still more likely to be young or black. But we also ﬁ  nd 
that low earners who work for temp agencies are also more likely to be male, 
to be native-  born, and to have above-  average personal characteristics than 
those not working for temps. In other words, the self-  selection mechanisms 
into temporary employment are somewhat diﬀerent among low earners than 
among others, with somewhat more positive self-  selection into temp agencies 
occurring among low earners, suggesting that it is important to control for 
such forms of selection in regression analysis, if possible.
Once these workers spend some time working for temp agencies during 
the three- year base period, how likely are they to continue with this form of 
employment in subsequent years? The answer to this question obviously has 
important implications for the issue of the extent to which temp agencies 
help workers—and especially low earners—transition to more stable and 
perhaps higher-  wage employment later on.
Table 11.3 presents data on the extent to which those who worked for 
temp agencies during the base period—either with any amount of temp 
employment or as their primary form of work—continue to work for temp 
agencies during the subsequent three years or six years. These data thus 
constitute elements of transition matrices for those at temp agencies during 
the base period, which shed light on the persistence of such employment 
over long periods of time. Once again, the data appear for all workers at 
temp agencies and only for those who were persistently low earners during 
the base period.
The results of table 11.3 show some persistence over time in the attach-
ment of workers to temp agencies, though large majorities of these workers 
Table 11.3  Dynamics of temp agency employment across three-  year time periods
Temp work in base period
Temp work in
    1996–1998 (%)  1999–2001 (%) 
A. All workers
  Any 40.2 26.4
  Primary 61.2 36.9
B. Persistently low earners
  Any 49.2 34.4
    Primary   63.9   41.5  
Notes: Samples consist of all workers (Panel A) and persistently low earners (Panel B) in the 
base period who worked for temp agencies, either at any time or as their primary employer. 
The table thus indicates the fractions of these workers who still work for temp agencies in 1996 
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no longer use temps by the period 1999 to 2001. For instance, among all 
workers who used temp agencies at any point in the base period, roughly 
40 percent still use them at some point over the 1996 to 1998 period, and 
about a fourth still do so during 1999 to 2001. Among those for whom temp 
agencies constituted the primary employer in the base period, persistence is 
even greater—with about 61 and 37 percent, respectively, having some temp 
employment in the 1996 to 1998 and 1999 to 2001 periods. Also, those who 
were low earners in the base period and who used temp employment show 
modestly higher persistence in temp agency use than do workers overall, 
though qualitatively the pattern is quite similar for low earners.
In any event, the impacts of temp agencies on subsequent advancement 
for low earners will likely depend heavily on whether workers who used 
temps in the base period continue to do so subsequently, and this factor must 
be taken into account when we do our multivariate analysis of earnings gains 
for temp users over time in the following.
Having analyzed the personal characteristics of temp workers and the 
persistence of temp employment over time, we now consider a range of 
employment outcomes among these workers—both during the base period 
and in the subsequent three-   and six-  year periods. For here onward, we 
focus exclusively on those who were persistently low earners during the base 
period—as this is the group for whom temp agency might be considered a 
stepping stone to more stable and successful job opportunities.
In table 11.4 we present a set of employment outcomes for those who used 
temp agencies for employment during the base period and those who did 
not. We present the outcomes for the base period, and also for the two sub-
sequent three-  year periods. The outcomes we consider are: (a) the number 
of quarters during which the individual was employed over the three-  year 
period—a rough measure of overall employment activity; (b) the number 
of full quarters worked with any employer during that time period, which 
measures employment instability; (c) the quarters of job tenure accumulated 
in their primary job during this period, or a measure of employment stabil-
ity; (d) average quarterly earnings during the three-  year period; (e) average 
quarterly earnings for full quarters worked with any employer during such a 
period; and (f) average annual earnings. Once again, these are presented sep-
arately for those with or without any temp employment in the base period, 
and for those with or without such employment as their primary source of 
work. And, in the two subsequent periods, we present results separately for 
the full samples of originally low earners (panels B and D) and for those 
omitting temp workers in the current period (panels C and E).
A number of ﬁ  ndings appear in table 11.4. During the base period, those 
low earners who work at temp agencies work a bit less (in terms of quarters 
of employment), and are considerably less likely to work full quarters for 
their employers or to generate signiﬁ  cant job tenure on these jobs. Their 
quarterly earnings in this time period are not greatly diﬀerent from those Table 11.4  Employment outcomes in all periods of low earners during the base 




    Yes   No   Yes   No
A. Base period
Quarters worked 10.09 10.39 9.99 10.34
Full quarters worked 5 7.85 5.15 7.48
Quarters of tenure 4.27 5.93 4.31 5.74
Quarterly earnings $2,098 $2,021 $1,993 $2,089
Full quarter earnings $2,365 $2,217 $2,221 $2,242
Annual earnings $6,729 $7,110 $6,544 $7,068
B. 1996 to 1998
Quarters worked 11.05 11.67 11.04 11.07
Full quarters worked 7.38 9.01 7.27 8.82
Quarters of tenure 7.12 12.22 6.73 11.66
Quarterly earnings $3,275 $2,997 $3,265 $3,030
Full quarter earnings $3,513 $3,076 $3,486 $3,129
Annual earnings $12,510 $11,048 $12,093 $11,181
C. 1996 to 1998 excluding current temp workers
Quarters worked 11.07 11.08 11.07 11.08
Full quarters worked 7.52 9.04 7.35 8.87
Quarters of tenure 7.09 12.29 5.72 11.78
Quarterly earnings $3,356 $2,996 $3,498 $3,033
Full quarter earnings $3,609 $3,074 $3,780 $3,130
Annual earnings $12,476 $11,052 $13,305 $11,196
D. 1999 to 2001
Quarters worked 11.1 11.15 11.07 11.14
Full quarters worked 7.48 8.57 7.43 8.44
Quarters of tenure 9.97 15.83 9.56 15.13
Quarterly earnings $4,295 $4,038 $4,279 $4,070
Full quarter earnings $4,473 $4,082 $4,452 $4,130
Annual earnings $16,058 $15,107 $15,945 $15,225
E. 1999–2001 Excluding current temp workers
Quarters worked 11.14 11.16 11.13 11.16
Full quarters worked 7.68 8.63 7.68 8.52
Quarters of tenure 10.20 16.03 9.39 15.39
Quarterly earnings $4,420 $4,045 $4,553 $4,084
Full quarter earnings $4,601 $4,087 $4,744 $4,141
Annual earnings   $16,590   $15,147   $17,054   $15,298
Notes: “Any temp employment” and “Primary temp employment” refer only to the base pe-
riod; thus, outcomes for 1996 to 1998 and 1999 to 2001 are conditioned on temp employment 
during the base period (1993 to 1995). Results for the latter period are also presented with 
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without such work, though their annual earnings are consistently lower 
(especially among those for whom such employment is their primary source 
of work over the base period).13
What happens to these low- earning workers over the subsequent three or 
six years in the labor market? Those who worked for temp agencies earlier 
on (of whom we now know that only a small fraction still work for temps) 
still work fewer full quarters for speciﬁ  c employers and therefore accumulate 
less tenure on any job. But now their earnings are higher than those of low 
earners who did not work for temp agencies earlier. Speciﬁ  cally, those with 
any temp agency employment in the base period now earn 8 to 9 percent 
more per quarter than those without such experience, and 9 to 14 percent 
more for full- quarter employment or annual employment. For those whose 
primary employment was through temp agencies in the base period, the 
positive earnings diﬀerentials relative to those without such work are fairly 
comparable (though just slightly smaller in most cases).
Among those who do not work in temp agencies in the subsequent periods, 
the earnings of earlier temp workers relative to nontemp workers are even 
larger.14 And, in tabulations not included in table 11.4, we ﬁ  nd these earnings 
gains among both women and men who were low earners in the base period, 
and among those of each racial/ ethnic group—though the gains associated 
with earlier temp employment are somewhat larger for women than for men 
and for minorities than whites.15
Do these subsequent earnings advantages persist over time? During the 
second subsequent three- year period, those who had worked for temp agen-
cies continue to have lower numbers of full quarters worked and less ten-
ure accumulated, but they still earn more than those who did not—with 
diﬀerentials that are just a bit smaller than during the ﬁ  rst subsequent period. 
Now we ﬁ  nd quarterly earnings that are about 5 to 6 percent higher among 
temp workers than among nontemp workers, full quarter earnings that are 
about 8 to 10 percent higher, and annual earnings that are 5 to 6 percent 
higher. Thus, most of the earnings advantages associated with earlier temp 
work seem to persist over time.
13. Since we are truncating the earnings distribution at a fairly low level when generating this 
sample, it is not surprising that earnings diﬀerences between those working and not working at 
temp agencies during this period are modest.
14. Panels C and E show earnings that are 12 to 19 percent higher among those who had 
earlier worked in temp agencies during 1996 to 1998 and 9 to 15 percent higher in 1999 to 2001.
15. For instance, full quarterly earnings are 16 percent higher among women and 7 percent 
higher among men in 1996 to 1998 among low earners who worked in temp agencies in 1993 to 
1995 (when their earnings were only 8 percent and 2 percent higher, respectively). Full quarterly 
earnings are 17 percent higher among whites, 12 percent higher among blacks, and 11 percent 
among Hispanics in 1996 to 1998, respectively, among those who worked for temp agencies 
in 1993 to 1995 (when their earnings were only 10 percent, 2 percent, and 2 percent higher, 
respectively). The gains associated with earlier temp work are thus higher for women than for 
men but higher for minorities than whites among low earners in the base period.388        Fredrik Andersson, Harry J. Holzer, and Julia Lane
Of course, these summary statistics on earnings do not control for per-
sonal characteristics, and we observed earlier (in table 11.2) that there is 
positive self-  selection into temporary employment among low earners in 
the labor market. We consider in the following whether the subsequently 
higher earnings among temp workers are still evident after controlling for 
observable diﬀerences in personal characteristics.
But, before we move to our regression analysis, we consider some data on 
the diﬀerences in job characteristics of low earners in the base period who 
work for temp agencies and those who do not—with the job characteristics 
presented for the base period and also for subsequent periods. In table 11.5 
we present data on the industries and ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects of employers of 
these diﬀerent groups of workers. Once again, we present results for the base 
period and for the two subsequent periods, and separately for full samples 
and for those omitting current temp workers in the latter periods.
The results suggest that, during the base period, low earners working for 
temp agencies were much less likely to work in agriculture, retail trade, and 
other services. To a lesser extent, this remains true in the subsequent periods 
as well, because of the persistence of temp agency employment across these 
periods. But, in subsequent periods, those who worked for temp agencies 
in the base period are also now more heavily concentrated in a variety of 
higher-  wage industries—notably durable manufacturing, but also to some 
extent in construction, nondurable manufacturing, transportation/  utilities, 
and wholesale trade. This remains true even in the period 1999 to 2001, with 
the data showing relatively little erosion of this eﬀect between the ﬁ  rst and 
second subsequent periods. Indeed, by 1996 to 1998, 26 percent of previ-
ously low earners who had any temp work in the base period had jobs in 
these higher-  wage industries, compared with only 18 percent of previously 
low earners who had no temp work in the base period. By 1999 to 2001 the 
proportions were roughly the same, at 28 percent versus 19 percent; the 
diﬀerences between those whose primary employment was in a temp agency 
and those for whom it was not are similar (though slightly smaller). And 
these diﬀerences are all considerably larger in the samples that exclude cur-
rent temp workers than in those that include them.
Furthermore, in the subsequent periods, those who worked for temp agen-
cies in the base period now work for employers with higher ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects 
than those who did not work for temp agencies. This was true to a small extent 
during the base period, but in subsequent periods, the gaps between the ﬁ  rm-
 ﬁ xed eﬀects of low earners who did and did not work for temp agencies in the 
base period, respectively, has grown. This is a critical ﬁ  nding, and suggests 
that temp agencies act as labor market intermediaries to link low earners to 
better employers than those whom they might be able to ﬁ  nd on their own. 
And, once again, there is only modest evidence of erosion in the magnitude 






Industry   Yes   No   Yes   No
A. Base period
  Agriculture 4.4 13.1 2.0 11.9
  Construction 4.3 3.4 3.2 3.6
  Durable  mfg. 4.2 2.4 2.7 2.7
  Nondurable  mfg. 6.0 5.7 5.6 5.9
    Trans., comm., and ut. 2.3 2.3 1.5 2.3
  Wholesale  trade 3.2 3.1 2.1 3.2
  Retail  trade 19.4 28.8 9.0 27.8
    Fin., insur. and RE 2.1 3.0 1.2 2.9
  Services
    Temp  agency 28.8 0.0 60.6 3.0
    Other 24.8 37.0 14.1 35.7
Public admin. 0.6 1.3 0.3 1.2
Firm- ﬁ  xed eﬀect –0.30 –0.34 –0.35 –0.34
B. 1996 to 1998
Industry
  Agriculture 3.7 12.0 2.1 10.9
  Construction 4.7 3.6 3.8 3.8
  Durable  mfg. 6.2 2.8 6.3 3.2
  Nondurable  mfg. 6.1 5.4 5.6 5.5
    Trans., comm., and ut. 3.3 2.6 2.7 2.7
  Wholesale  trade 3.9 3.2 3.4 3.3
  Retail  trade 19.0 25.5 12.7 24.8
    Fin., insur., and RE 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.1
  Services
    Temp  agency 21.2 2.2 37.2 4.2
    Other 28.0 38.3 22.2 37.1
Public admin. 0.9 1.5 0.8 1.4
Firm- ﬁ  xed eﬀect –0.24 –0.3 –0.26 –0.29
C. 1996 to 1998 excluding current temp workers
Industry
  Agriculture 3.70 10.90 2.20 10.20
  Construction 5.40 3.30 5.30 3.50
  Durable  mfg. 10.00 3.20 12.80 3.90
  Nondurable  mfg. 9.90 6.50 10.70 6.80
    Trans., comm., and ut. 4.60 2.70 5.00 2.90
  Wholesale  trade 5.90 3.50 7.50 3.70
  Retail  trade 21.20 25.60 18.80 25.20
    Fin., insur., and RE 4.20 3.30 4.90 3.30
  Services 33.50 39.30 38.80 31.00
Public admin. 1.70 1.70 1.90 1.70
Firm- ﬁ  xed eﬀect –0.11 –0.26 –0.06 –0.25
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11.4.2      Regression Equations for Earnings in Subsequent Periods
The extent to which employment in these higher- wage industries and ﬁ  rms 
might account for the stronger employment outcomes in subsequent periods 
for low earners who initially worked at temp agencies, especially once we 
control for other personal characteristics, must now be ascertained.
In tables 11.6 and 11.7 we present the results of estimated regression 
equations of the following form for those who were low earners in the base 
period:
(2) ln(EARN)ij,tl  f(TEMP it, TEMP i,tl, Xi, Xi,tl, TENij,tl, TIMEtl; Xj) 
   uij,tl,





Industry   Yes   No   Yes   No
D. 1999 to 2001
Industry
  Agriculture 3.1 11.2 1.6 10.2
  Construction 5.5 4.1 4.2 4.3
  Durable  mfg. 7.1 3.6 7.7 4.1
  Nondurable  mfg. 6.6 5.1 6.4 5.4
    Trans., comm., and ut. 4.1 2.9 3.8 3.1
  Wholesale  trade 4.4 3.6 5.1 3.7
  Retail  trade 17.9 24.0 13.0 23.3
    Fin., insur., and RE 3.2 3.5 3.2 3.5
  Services
    Temp  agency 16.5 3.3 26.1 4.7
    Other 30.2 37.2 36.3 27.6
Public admin. 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.3
Firm- ﬁ  xed eﬀect –0.17 –0.25 –0.18 –0.24
E. 1999–2001 excluding current temp workers
Industry
  Agriculture 3.00 9.70 2.00 9.00
  Construction 5.90 3.90 6.00 4.10
  Durable  mfg. 10.40 3.90 13.30 4.60
  Nondurable  mfg. 9.10 5.90 10.00 6.30
    Trans., comm., and ut. 5.30 3.10 5.60 3.30
  Wholesale  trade 6.40 3.80 7.50 4.00
  Retail  trade 18.00 22.80 14.80 21.40
    Fin., insur., and RE 4.20 3.70 5.30 3.80
  Services 34.70 41.00 33.40 40.40
Public admin 2.40 2.20 2.50 2.20
Firm- ﬁ  xed eﬀect   –0.05   –0.2   –0.01   –0.19
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where EARN represents quarterly earnings, TEMP represents employment 
at a temp agency, TEN represents job tenure, TIME represents quarter 
dummies, X represents a variety of characteristics; i, j, and t denote the 
person, ﬁ  rm, and time period, respectively, and l takes on the values of 1 
or 2, depending on whether the observation is in the ﬁ  rst or second of the 
three-  year periods subsequent to the base period.
In other words, we have estimated earnings equations across person-
  quarters, separately for the periods 1996 to 1998 and 1999 to 2001. We are 
primarily interested in the coeﬃcients (and t-  statistics) on employment at 
Table 11.6  Estimated eﬀects of temp agency employment during base period on 
earnings in subsequent periods: All low earners during the base period 
(T- statistics)
Temp employment
All earnings Full quarter earnings
    Any   Primary   Any   Primary
1996 to 1998
Controlling for
  Race/gender,  foreign-  born –.193 –.168 .144 .120
(22.18) (10.13) (17.98) (7.69)
  Race/gender,  foreign-  born,  current 
  temp
–.070 .062 .181 .192
(7.74) (3.64) (21.86) (11.69)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect –.103 .018 .156 .164
(11.87) (1.07) (20.10) (10.55)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect, tenure .036 .103 .112 .124
(4.17) (6.35) (14.21) (8.02)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect, tenure, ﬁ  rm- 
  ﬁ  xed eﬀect
–.039 .032 .043 .049
(4.89) (2.15) (5.98) (3.50)
1999 to 2001
Controlling for
  Race/gender,  foreign-  born –.129 –.136 .126 .090
(12.66) (6.95) (13.90) (5.12)
  Race/gender,  foreign-  born,  current 
  temp
–.037 .018 .152 .135
(3.61) (10.94) (16.56) (7.55)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect –.074 –.021 .131 .118
(7.43) (1.10) (14.92) (6.84)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect, tenure .021 .035 .098 .083
(2.17) (1.88) (11.03) (4.85)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect, tenure, ﬁ  rm- 
  ﬁ  xed eﬀect
–.056 –.033 .028 .014
  (6.17)   (1.91)   (3.42)   (0.90)
Notes: The dependent variable in these regression equations is ln (quarterly earnings). Obser-
vations are person- quarters. The samples are restricted to those with full- quarter employment 
with any employer for results listed as “full- quarter.” Each equation also includes controls for 
age and time dummies. Regressions are based on a 10 percent random sample of the relevant 
population (as described in the appendix).392        Fredrik Andersson, Harry J. Holzer, and Julia Lane
temp agencies during the base period, which is what we present in those 
tables. All other variables appear as controls.16
In table 11.6 we present ﬁ  ve speciﬁ  cations of each equation. In the ﬁ  rst, we 
control for observable ﬁ  xed characteristics such as race/ gender and foreign- 
born status, as well as age and time (quarter). In the second we add a control 
for current employment at a temp agency. In the third, we replace the ﬁ  xed 
personal characteristics noted previously with a person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect. In the 
fourth we add a control for tenure in the current job. Finally, in the ﬁ  fth, we 
add the ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect. These diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations shed light on how our 
results might be inﬂ  uenced by the omission or inclusion of all of these vari-
ables, since it seems that temp employment in the base period draws workers 
with diﬀerent personal characteristics rather than the overall population 
Table 11.7  Estimated eﬀects of temp agency employment during base period on 
earnings in subsequent periods: Low earners during the base period who 
do not work for temp agencies in subsequent periods (T- statistics)
Temp employment
All earnings Full quarter earnings
    Any   Primary  Any   Primary
1996 to 1998
Controlling for
  Race/gender,  foreign-  born –.075 .025 .203 .310
(8.10) (1.26) (24.05) (16.59)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect –.102 –.018 .180 .278
(11.41) (0.90) (22.69) (15.71)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect, tenure .065 .187 .132 .212
(7.26) (9.74) (16.28) (11.94)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect, tenure, ﬁ  rm- 
  ﬁ  xed eﬀect
–.027 .063 .055 .098
(3.24) (3.55) (7.39) (6.09)
1999 to 2001
Controlling for
  Race/gender,  foreign-  born –.004 .081 .180 .206
(0.34) (5.69) (19.21) (10.71)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect –.035 .041 .161 .186
(3.40) (1.91) (18.00) (10.01)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect, tenure .081 .149 .127 .144
(8.00) (7.14) (14.00) (7.75)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect, tenure, ﬁ  rm- 
  ﬁ  xed eﬀect
–.024 .017 .042 .036
  (2.57)   (0.89)   (5.08)   (2.15)
Note: Samples exclude workers who worked for temp agencies during the quarter observed in 
the periods 1996 to 1998 or 1999 to 2001. Other conditions from note in table 11.6 apply.
16. These regressions are based on random 10 percent samples of the full populations that 
meet our sampling criteria; sample sizes are thus about one-  tenth of those that appear in the 
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of low earners, and since temp employment may or may not causally aﬀect 
not only subsequent job tenure and ﬁ  rm characteristics but also subsequent 
temp employment.
Separate equations have been estimated for all earnings and for full- quarter 
earnings (in the latter case, the sample is restricted only to individual work-
ers’ person-  quarters of full-  quarter employment with any particular ﬁ  rm). 
Separate estimates are also provided for those with any temp employment 
in the base period versus those whose primary employment was through 
the temp agency, and also for 1996 to 1998 versus 1999 to 2001. Also, table 
11.6 presents results for all workers who were persistently low earners in the 
base period, while table 11.7 presents them only for nontemp workers in the 
subsequent three-  year periods.17
Overall, the estimated eﬀects of temp employment for low earners in the 
base period on their subsequent earnings are somewhat varied. The esti-
mates for all earnings are quite mixed, with primary employment at a temp 
agency showing more positive eﬀects than any temp employment, but the 
eﬀects of temp employment on full-  quarter earnings are uniformly posi-
tive—suggesting that those who manage to gain more stable employment 
after their temp experience beneﬁ  t more from it than those who do not gain 
stable employment.
Without controlling for current temp employment, eﬀects on all earn-
ings are negative, though still positive for those with full-  quarter earnings 
only. Controlling for current temp activity makes the results for all earnings 
considerably less negative, and even positive for those with primary temp 
employment in the base period. Controlling for person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects consis-
tently makes the estimated eﬀects of temp agencies less positive, by 2 to 4 
log points; this is consistent with the notion of some positive self-  selection 
into temp employment among low earners. Controlling for tenure has mixed 
eﬀects, making the estimates more positive for all earnings (consistent with 
the shorter tenure among temp users that we observed in earlier tables) but 
less positive for those with full-  quarter earnings (implying longer tenure 
among temp users who have full-  quarter employment). Also, the estimated 
eﬀects of current temp agency employment are large and negative in all 
equations (not shown in the tables), but controlling for these makes the 
eﬀects of previous temp employment more positive as well.
Controlling for current temp status and also for job tenure, all of the 
estimated eﬀects of temp agencies on either earnings measure are positive. 
Thus, both the estimates for full-  quarter earnings and those controlling for 
tenure show that temp agencies have positive eﬀects on the earnings of low 
earners who manage to transition to stable non-  temp employment afterward. 
And while some—though not all—of the positive estimated eﬀects of temp 
17. Table 11.7 thus contains just four speciﬁ  cations, since the second one from table 11.6 is 
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employment diminish between the ﬁ  rst and second three-  year periods after 
the base period, at least some positive eﬀects persist over time, suggesting 
that the positive eﬀects are not purely short-  term.
But all of the positive estimates become much smaller (or even negative) 
once we control for ﬁ  rm ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Indeed, controlling for ﬁ  rm charac-
teristics consistently reduces the positive impacts of temp agencies by about 
seven log points. In other words, most of the positive eﬀects of temp agencies 
on subsequent earnings of low earners occur because they improve the access 
of these workers to higher- wage employers. This is consistent with the results 
reported in Andersson, Holzer, and Lane (2005).
When we consider the eﬀects of earlier temp employment on those not 
working as temps in the subsequent periods in table 11.7, we generally ﬁ  nd 
much more positive eﬀects of earlier temp employment than in table 11.6. 
As before, results for those with full- quarter earnings are positive and quite 
large—with earlier temp employment raising subsequent earnings by 20 
to 30 log points in 1996 to 1998 and 16 to 20 log points in 1999 to 2001. 
For those with any earnings, the eﬀects remain mixed but are clearly posi-
tive after controlling for job tenure. And controlling for ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects 
now reduces the estimated eﬀects of early temp employment by 9 to 13 log 
points.
To see more clearly the apparent positive impact of temp employment on 
the quality of ﬁ  rms to which workers get matched subsequently, we present 
estimates of early temp employment on the ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects in 1996 to 1998 
and 1999 to 2001 in table 11.8. As before, estimates appear for full-  quarter 
earnings only and for all earnings, and for any earlier temp employment 
as well as primary employment during the base period. Results from two 
speciﬁ  cations are presented: the ﬁ  rst, in which we control for observable 
personal characteristics (i.e., race/  gender and foreign-  born status), and the 
second controlling for person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects. As in table 11.7, those who still 
work with temp agencies in the subsequent periods are removed from the 
sample.
The results show quite substantial positive eﬀects of early temp employ-
ment on the subsequent quality of ﬁ  rms to which low-  earning workers are 
matched. For all earners, ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects are 9 to 14 percentage points 
higher among those who earlier had worked for temp agencies; among those 
with full-  quarter earnings, ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects are 9 to 18 percentage points 
higher. Thus, for those making successful transitions to stable post-  temp 
employment, access to higher- wage ﬁ  rms is improved by having worked for 
a time with a temp agency.
11.5    Conclusion
Using new longitudinal data from the Census Bureau on the universe of 
UI- covered workers and their employers in ﬁ  ve states, we have estimated the Temporary Help Agencies and the Advancement Prospects of Low Earners    3 9 5
eﬀects of temp employment on the earnings of persistently low earners over 
a subsequent six-  year period.
Our results show that temp earners clearly have lower earnings than oth-
ers while working at these agencies, and even their subsequent earnings are 
somewhat mixed. But these earnings are generally higher if they manage to 
gain stable employment with other employers. In particular, we ﬁ  nd that the 
eﬀects of temp agency employment in the base period on subsequent earn-
ings are uniformly positive for those reporting full- quarter earnings, and for 
all earnings once we control for job tenure.
While there is some positive self selection among low earners into temp 
employment, controlling for person- ﬁ  xed eﬀects does not completely elimi-
nate the positive eﬀects associated with temp employment. Furthermore, 
the positive eﬀects seem mostly to occur because those working for temp 
agencies subsequently work for higher-  wage ﬁ  rms than do comparable low 
earners who do not work for temps. And the positive eﬀects we estimate seem 
to persist over time, for as much as six years beyond the base period during 
which the temp employment was observed.
Thus, our results are consistent with the notion that low earners, in addi-
tion to any deﬁ  ciencies in skills that they bring to the labor market, some-
times have diﬃculty matching themselves to higher-  wage employers in the 
labor market. This might reﬂ  ect employer discrimination, their own limited 
Table 11.8  Estimated eﬀects of temp agency employment during base period on ﬁ  rm 
ﬁ  xed eﬀect in subsequent periods: Low earners during the base period 
who do not work for temp agencies in subsequent periods
Temp employment
All earnings Full quarter earnings
     Any   Primary   Any   Primary
1996 to 1998
Controlling for
  Race/gender,  foreign-  born .099 .131 .127 .178
(31.15) (19.00) (29.31) (18.63)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect .088 .118 .092 .135
(28.26) (17.67) (22.65) (15.16)
1999 to 2001
Controlling for
  Race/gender,  foreign-  born .113 .139 .133 .163
(30.46) (18.10) (28.39) (16.93)
  Person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect .102 .128 .103 .130
    (28.16)   (17.09)   (23.02)   (14.20)
Notes: Samples exclude workers who worked for temp agencies during the quarter observed 
in the periods 1996 to 1998 or 1999 to 2001. Other conditions from the note to table 11.6 apply, 
except that the dependent variable is now the ﬁ  rm-  ﬁ  xed eﬀect for that quarter.396        Fredrik Andersson, Harry J. Holzer, and Julia Lane
information, and informal contacts in the labor market, transportation, and 
geographic mismatch, or other problems.
But temp agencies, and perhaps other labor market intermediaries, can 
help these workers overcome these problems and gain access to better 
employers across their regional labor markets. By providing the initial con-
tact with employers, these intermediaries can perhaps overcome transporta-
tion and informational barriers that limit initial access (Giloth 2003), and by 
providing information about worker quality and previous performance that 
might be unobservable to employers on their own, they may overcome dis-
criminatory behaviors among employers (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2003). 
Indeed, the results suggest that such intermediaries may play a signiﬁ  cant 
role in a strategy of helping the working poor advance in the labor market 
by moving them into better jobs over time, as long as such placements can be 
combined with appropriate job training and support services (Holzer 2004; 
Holzer and Martinson 2005).
Our results are thus consistent with much of the earlier literature on temp 
agencies that we reviewed previously, though somewhat less consistent with 
the recent work by Autor and Houseman in Detroit, which suggested that 
any positive eﬀects are spurious or transitory. On the other hand, even in 
their work, contractors who placed TANF recipients into permanent jobs 
also generated positive impacts on earnings that persisted over time. In this 
broader sense, the results of Autor and Houseman are quite consistent with 
our results here, suggesting that temps and/  or other intermediaries who 
manage to achieve more permanent job placements for their workers can 
have positive impacts.
Of course, we have not fully eliminated possible self-  selection eﬀects 
regarding temps, since person-  ﬁ  xed eﬀects do not control for any time-
  varying characteristics of these individuals. But, combined with the clear 
evidence that temp agencies result in subsequent employment at higher-
 wage  ﬁ  rms, our ﬁ  ndings at least suggest that the positive eﬀects of temp 
agencies or other intermediaries on the job- matching process for low earners 
might be real and persistent.Temporary Help Agencies and the Advancement Prospects of Low Earners    3 9 7
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